A Black Mark on FDR's Presidency
Roosevelt was pressured by advisors, and fear and prejudice ruled the day
It's a question that still vexes historians: Why did Franklin Roosevelt, one of the country's greatest wartime presidents and a revered humanitarian, sign an order that condemned nearly 120,000 people of Japanese ancestry, most of them Americans, to years of unwarranted incarceration?
For years, the president's decision was justified with two simple words: "military necessity." Lt. Gen. John DeWitt, the Army commander overseeing the West Coast, believed neither Japanese-born immigrants nor their American children could be trusted. Fearing invasion, he thought the Japanese community was filled with spies and saboteurs. A month after Pearl Harbor, DeWitt insisted that the fact that there had not yet been any acts of sabotage "proved" that such attacks were imminent. (No American of Japanese ancestry was ever convicted of sabotage during the war.) Though Roosevelt's own intelligence network on the West Coast was assuring him that the Japanese-American community was loyal, when his local military commander pushed for removal, he relented.
The sad truth of the matter, historians say, is that DeWitt wasn't alone: The entire political establishment in the western states, from governors to congressmen to law enforcement, was pushing for "evacuation," too. War hysteria and race prejudice ruled the day. Henry McLemore, a popular newspaper columnist, captured the tenor of the times in January 1942: "I am for immediate removal of every Japanese on the West Coast to a point deep in the interior," he wrote. "I don't mean a nice part of the interior either. Herd 'em up, pack 'em off, and give 'em the inside room in the badlands."
It still isn't clear exactly what Roosevelt thought, but his cardinal sin during the months after Pearl Harbor, historians believe, was not saying anything at all. He certainly wasn't a rabid racist, and he didn't fan the flames of prejudice, but he didn't try to douse them, either. As more bad news came in from the Pacific, political momentum swelled. By February, Roosevelt faced a united front and gave in. "In times of stress," says Greg Robinson, author of By Order of the President: FDR and the Internment of Japanese Americans, "nobody can be trusted to defend constitutional rights without public support."
Once the decision was made, Roosevelt seemed to have few regrets. At a press conference in 1944, after he had won re-election and when there was no longer any threat of invasion, Roosevelt told reporters: "A good deal of progress has been made in scattering [Japanese-Americans] throughout the country," he said. "And it is felt by a great many lawyers that under the Constitution they can't be kept locked up in concentration camps." Two months later, the government announced that the internees were free to go.
Reader Comments
Niihau incident overlooked?
Actually, there was a case where Japanese Americans took up arms in support of Japan and it influenced the internment decision.
http://www.historynet.com/the-niihau-incident.htm/2
A Black Mark on FDR's Presidency--Not so.
It is unfortunate that so many current news writers know so little about so many subjects they write about, particulary so with regard to WWII history. The article "A Black Mark on FDR's Presidency," which smears FDR's name because of his authorization of the WWII internment of resident Japanese nationals and Japanese-Americans for military reasons, is a case in point.
Before Pearl Harbor, U.S. codebreakers were intercepting Japanese consular message which revealed espionage involving resident Japanee nationals and Japanese Americans. Numerous Japanese patriotic societies on the west coast were supporting the Japanese war effort in East Asia by collecting money and sending it to Japan.
Because of such activities by persons of Japanese ancestry in this country, when the Japanese struck Pearl Harbor there were urgent security reasons for separating the loyal from the disloyal pesons of Japanese descent. This could not be done overnight so evacuation and relocation of such persons from military zones on the west coast was considered a necessity until screening could determine their status..
Of the so-called "internees," two-thirds of the ADULTS were not U.S. citizens but were Japanese nationals, enemy aliens subject to detention under long-standfing law. The American-born children of such enemy aliens were kept with them to keep families together. Their average age at the time was 15 years. However most of those over age 17 among them were also citizens of Japan (dual citizens). Thousands of these young Japanese-Americans had been educated in Japan, returning to the U.S. more Japanese than American, some as members of the Japanese military reserves. .
The above only scratches the surface of this complex wartime situation. There is much, much, more. There exists an abundance of now-declassified documents supporting the military justification for the internment for the legitimate researcher to exam. Unfortunately some who do so, because of the conventionl wisdom and a pre-disposed politically-correct agenda, ignore or distort the wartime government's side of the story. FDR may have been wrong about some things but he was certainly right to evacuate persons of Japanese ancestry from the West Coast after Pearl Harbor and his memory should not be dishonored for doing so.
William J. Hopwood, CDR USNR (Ret.)
Veteran WWII"
Justin, a review of Chapter V, "Japanese Evacuation From the West Coast" of Conn, Englemman, and Fairchild's "Guarding the United States and its Outposts." [Center of Military History, U.S.Army] is suggested.
As Conn clearly shows, DeWitt, up to his final recommendation to the War Department on 13 Feb. 1942, (prior to FDR's E.O.9066) was consistent in his opposition to the detention of American citizens.
His final recommendation to the War Department was that "citizen evacuees would either ACCEPT INTERNMENT VOLUNTARILY OR RELOCATE THEMSELVES with such assistance as state and federal agencies might offer." (Emphasis mine)
In his final recommentation, DeWitt also called for the inclusion of ALL enemy aliens (German and Italians as well as Japanese) in any evacuation decided.
The evacuation decision was made in the War Department and instructions to DeWitt for instrumentation thereof differed markedly from DeWitt's final recommendation in a number of respects.
But the fact is that from early on to his final recommendation prior to the Evacuation Decision made in Washington, DeWitt was consistent in his opposition to the detainment of American citizens of Japanese descent. As a good soldier, however, he bowed to the orders of his superiors and carried out their instructions to the best of his ability.
Today of course Dewitt has become the whipping boy for the reperations activists from whom you seem to received the Cliff Notes for your articles.
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