CIA Works to Limit Number of Contractors

Since 9/11, the CIA has increasingly relied on private contractors to help complete a variety of its assignments. From the interrogation of so-called high-value detainees and the operation of unmanned drones to a program to kill or capture al Qaeda's top brass, contractors have an important and controversial role in the world of espionage. It's a role that's coming under growing scrutiny even as spy agencies like the CIA try to wean themselves off the private workforce.

Contractors do have their advantages. They can make the often lumbering intelligence or military bureaucracies more nimble in the face of quickly changing circumstances. Without spending years training personnel, for instance, the government can simply purchase the specialties that it needs from an outside firm. And there are no legacy costs for healthcare or pensions.

Then again, outside contractors are generally far more expensive in upfront costs than the aver age federal employee. Congressional investigators estimate that the average federal employee costs the government just over $120,000 per year, while a contractor can cost more than $250,000. And contractors' accountability—particularly for dangerous and politically explosive international projects—is sometimes unclear. The legal accountability of contractors in general is currently being tested by several lawsuits against military contractors for their actions overseas.

Attorney General Eric Holder has appointed John Durham, a veteran prosecutor, to investigate allegations of CIA abuse of prisoners. Outside contractors were involved in the harsh interrogation of suspects, and Durham is expected to look at their actions.

Most intelligence contractors work behind the scenes doing unglamorous jobs in support, technology, and analysis. Gone are the days when the CIA relied on a team of in-house scientists and engineers to custom-design and build all its own communications gear or clandestine gadgets. Much of that technology—from computers to cameras—is now available on the open market. When the intelligence community built its computer infrastructure, for example, much of the work was done by outside contractors, according to officials familiar with the agency's history with contractors.

But the agency is also dipping into the marketplace for frontline operatives. A CIA inspector general's report made public last week detailed severe interrogations of suspected terrorists between 2001 and 2004, which were sometimes administered by CIA contractors. One such instance involved former military trainers from one of the Pentagon's survival schools who went inside the CIA's network of secret prisons to help oversee the interrogation of terrorist suspects.

News also leaked out last month about a clandestine program to kill al Qaeda leaders that was coordinated by the private security company Xe Services, formerly known as Blackwater. Sen. Dianne Feinstein, the California Democrat who chairs the Senate Intelligence Committee, would not confirm the details of that program, but she did say that the spying world was "over-reliant on contractors to carry out its work. This is especially a problem when contractors are used to carry out activities that are inherently governmental."

The law itself has been fuzzy on the issue of contractor accountability. In 2006, Congress passed legislation aiming to immunize contractors from lawsuits, though it has yet to be tested in court. But while contractors' precise legal liability may be different from that of a government employee, says former CIA chief Michael Hayden, agency officials have the "same moral and legal responsibilities" whether employing contractors or full-time staff. The legal memos that established guidelines for the CIA's interrogation program, for instance, are silent on the use of contractors in interrogations.

The reliance on a for-hire workforce in the intelligence community goes back to the end of the Cold War, when the spying budget was slashed. Years later, when the CIA began to pursue al Qaeda after the 9/11 attacks, the agency found itself short staffed, particularly in regard to those with the appropriate language skills. The recent inspector general's report also says that the CIA was woefully short of employees with knowledge about interrogations. Because Congress legislates how many people the CIA and other intelligence agencies can employ, the CIA was forced to turn to contractors to accomplish its missions quickly, say former senior intelligence officials. Those contractors were frequently recently retired CIA and military personnel.