Heading for Geneva: "We Have a Strength We Haven't Had Before"

This story originally appeared in the November 18, 1985, issue of U.S.News & World Report.

Q  Mr. President, you've been briefed by Secretary of State Shultz on his trip to Moscow. Did that briefing disturb you about the way the summit is shaping up?
A  No, not at all, because Secretary Shultz's trip wasn't to do any major negotiating. The purpose was to give the Soviets the ideas we thought should be discussed at the summit and to find out from them what it was they wanted to discuss. To that end, I think the meeting served a useful purpose.

I think, also, that there's been too much of a tendency to try to build a euphoria in advance of the summit. None of us are euphoric about this. We realize that the United States and the Soviet Union have very real differences that have to be discussed. So George was trying to portray that meeting as not anything that should promote euphoric hopes that complex problems could be solved immediately.

Q  Do you believe, as some experts do, that you are going to Geneva in an unusually strong bargaining position?
A  Compared to previous years, yes. We do have a strength that we haven't had in times before this, both military and economic. We certainly don't go hat in hand. I believe this strength will aid us not in imposing our will on someone—we don't intend to do that—but in convincing the Soviets that there is an advantage to both nations in arriving at a better understanding than we have now.

Q  How will you explain to Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev at Geneva your thinking behind the Strategic Defense Initiative, commonly known as Star Wars?
A  Well, the whole thing started right in our Cabinet Room quite some time ago. That was when, meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I brought up the question that nuclear weapons were the first weapons in the history of man that had not led to the creation of a defensive system to protect against them. I asked if it was worthwhile looking into this. Is it possible to come up with a defense? They were all agreed it was. And right there the program was given birth.

I think when Mr. Gorbachev understands that, he'll understand why we're not going to halt research into something that could be so important to all mankind. Our hope is that they might agree that both sides would do away with a certain number of weapons in our nuclear arsenals. If and when the research reveals that such a system is practical—that it could intercept missiles on their way to the target—then I believe that system should be used to bring an end to the threat of nuclear war.

I really mean it when I say that I would like to propose that we sit down with all nations that have nuclear weapons and work out an arrangement where they all agree to eliminate the weapons. In return, we would make this defensive system available to all the world. But if they wouldn't do that, it would not mean we would forgo deploying the system.

Q  Are you committed to going ahead with testing and developing SDI, or is this something you would be prepared to negotiate with the Soviet Union?
A  We believe all of that falls within the ABM Treaty. There have been protests from the Soviet Union that this isn't true. Well, we claim they've made some violations of the treaty. But, for our own part, we plan to remain within the treaty limits. We don't think that point comes up until you get to deployment, and before deployment we would seek the kind of agreement I mentioned.

Q  So you feel everything short of deployment is permissible under the ABM Treaty?
A  We believe that research in this process I outlined is well within the bounds of the treaty.

Q  Can we return to the question of whether you are prepared to negotiate Soviet demands that the United States put limits on testing and developing defensive weapons as a condition for their reducing offensive weapons?
A  No, I think that's a part of research. The Soviet Union is far ahead of us in this same kind of research. They started it years ago, and I think maybe one of their concerns is that we might get it before they do.

Q  And so you're saying that research, as you've defined it, is nonnegotiable?
A  We are going to seek to find out if there isn't a defensive weapon to match this offensive weapon.

Q  Do you think you may be able to persuade Secretary Gorbachev at Geneva to agree to a set of principles to help accelerate development of an arms-control agreement?
A  I won't talk too much about negotiating tactics in advance, because then those tactics become useless. But I recently read a statement I like to quote: ''Nations do not distrust each other because they are armed; they are armed because they distrust each other.'' So our negotiations should be aimed at eliminating the distrust. This would require not just words between us but deeds—actions that we both could take that would help convince the other side that we mean no first strike and no harm.

Q  What would constitute a successful summit?
A  For one thing, if we set a plan for continued negotiations, an agreement to go on seeing each other and working on these various problems. Another standard is if we eliminate enough distrust so both nations recognize that the details of arms control should now be turned over to our negotiators in Geneva, where the focus of our effort should be. Remember, the Soviets are on public record that they would like to see the elimination of nuclear weapons and certainly a reduction that might eventually lead to that. Well, if we both are agreed on that, then we certainly ought to be willing to find a way to get at it.

Q  Then you might expect from Geneva some kind of formal arms-control commitment from you and Gorbachev that would then be turned over to your negotiators to flesh out?
A  Yes. In two days of talks, I can't believe we will deal with specifics and numbers. It's apparent that we have agreed to some of the terms they submitted in their proposal.

I think we'd be wasting our time if we tried to fight down to the wire on the complexities of individual weapons or things of that kind in my meeting in Geneva. What is to be discussed there is much broader than that. It isn't really just arms control to be settled there. What is to be settled are the things like, for example, regional and bilateral issues that would make arms control a natural follow-up.

I engaged in negotiations in the labor-management field on labor's side for 20-odd years. I've always believed you go in with your proposal, there's a counterproposal and you keep on going until someplace between those two proposals you arrive at something mutually satisfactory.

Q  Many experts say that if the U.S. pursues SDI, the Soviets will only increase their deployment of long-range missiles even faster. Isn't that a risk?
A  Except for one thing: While we're going forward with SDI, they're going to have to understand that there's no way we will let them achieve a great superiority in arms that puts us at risk. If they're prepared to face the fact that we're determined not to give them such an edge, then I think they'll see the wisdom of serious discussion.

Q  So you'd like to see the Soviets hold offensive weapons in place while the exploration continues?
A  Both of us have expressed the desire to reduce the number of weapons. I just have to believe they will understand that we really mean we're not trying to develop a defensive weapon in order to obtain a first-strike advantage—that we'll sit and talk with them before we take advantage of that weapon once it is proven practical.

Q  Is your SDI system non-nuclear?
A  That's right, yes.

Q  But we seem to be continuing underground testing of nuclear versions of SDI—
A  You must remember that we are still playing catch-up with the Soviet Union on nuclear weapons. They are several systems ahead of us in their modernization program. Our testing is routine, because we have several projects on the drawing board that would probably be eliminated if we achieved an agreement on reduction of weapons.

Q  Do you rule out a total ban on nuclear testing, as the Soviets have suggested?
A  Their proposal was unfair in that, as I say, they are ahead of us and we're playing catch-up. A moratorium on testing would be a great advantage for them. They would then have a built-in superiority, and we would be prevented from trying to overcome that imbalance.

Q  The Soviets say they are prepared to accept on-site inspections and other procedures to verify compliance with a nuclear-arms agreement. Does this give hope for such an agreement?
A  We hope so, because their reluctance to allow any real verification has been one of the failing points in all the previous arms negotiations.

Q  The Defense Department is preparing a report expected to show Soviet violations of the SALT II arms agreement. If Gorbachev does not give you assurances in Geneva that he will comply with that agreement, will you continue to honor the terms anyway after it expires at the end of this year?
A  We said we would continue the restraint that both had pledged to follow under SALT II, but it would be dependent on Soviet restraint also. Obviously we're not going to stand by if we're the only one practicing the restraint.

Q  Will you ask in Geneva for assurances on that point?
A  I think that will probably be discussed, yes.

Q  Gorbachev apparently is a fairly combative and ideologically committed person. How do you plan to deal with him in summit negotiations?
A  His attitude is understandable. No man would be in his position unless he adhered to the Soviet policy and Communist philosophy. But I don't think it's necessary to try and disabuse him of his beliefs. We have to live in the world together. The idea is to point out to them that we're not out to destroy their system or change it, nor are we going to allow them to change ours. We recognize that it is an advantage to both of us to have continued peace and to go forward with the systems under which we presently exist—but to eliminate the distrust between us.

The United States is not an aggressor nation. One can look back to the years following World War II, when we were the only major nation in the world that had not had its industry pounded to rubble by bombings. Our military strength was at its very height, even though we had grievous losses in the war. And we had the ultimate weapon—a monopoly on that weapon. In all those years, we not only did not take advantage of that strength when we could have dictated to the world, but we tried to introduce measures that would place nuclear power in international hands so there wouldn't be any country with a monopoly on it.

Contrast that with the Soviet Union's vast military buildup—which is basically offensive, not a defensive buildup. Contrast it with their aggression in Afghanistan, Ethiopia, South Yemen and here in our own hemisphere. If there's anyone that has a right to believe they're threatened, it is the West to believe it is threatened by the Soviet Union.

Q  Gorbachev argues that the military-industrial complex and anti-Soviet extremists dominate American foreign policy. Will you try to convince him that he is mistaken?
A  I think that would be very easy to do. You only have to look at the amount of money we are spending on weapons systems—what percent of our gross national product in comparison to what the Soviets are spending. You'll see that's a very minor element in our whole economy and could not possibly influence national policy. Once that is pointed out to him, I think he'd understand.

Q  You've described the Soviet Union as an evil empire that reserves the right to lie, cheat and steal. After all your preparations for Geneva, do you still hold that view?
A  Well, it really wasn't my view. That began in the first press conference I ever held as President, when I was asked whether we could believe the Soviets. I cited statements by their own leaders over the years saying there is no immorality in anything that furthers the progress of the world's socialist revolution. So we seem to be the only ones that in our philosophy are bound by morality.

Q  Mr. President, would you like to have annual summits with the Soviet leadership?
A  Both sides have talked about the possibility of additional meetings. I will probably propose—if they don't—that we have an exchange of future meetings in our own countries instead of going to a neutral country.

Q  On an annual basis?
A  I haven't thought particularly about setting the actual time. But I think it would automatically follow that, yes, we'd be talking next year and the year after.

Q  If we could change to domestic issues for a minute: Your proposal for tax reform seems to be flying apart in the House Ways and Means Committee. How can you rescue it?
A  Well, we're trying, and I know that Chairman Rostenkowski is also. But it is true that there are many special interests who are trying to promote changes here and there which I think would water down the whole idea of fairness and simplicity. We have registered our disagreement with a number of those things. And I think that there are also some members of the Congress who don't want tax reform, who like the system the way it is.

Q  Specifically, what parts of tax reform are being watered down?
A  It's still going on up there, and I haven't wanted to make Chair man Rostenkowski's task any more difficult. But my reservations concern the putting back of loopholes that we think should be eliminated. Some of those loopholes were put in for a legitimate reason, but they were put in when tax rates were extremely high. You can take away a loophole, and the reduction of rates that is proposed will give you a tax cut rather than a tax increase, even with the loss of that loophole.

Q  Would you veto a tax-reform bill without major elements such as the elimination of deductions for state and local taxes or leaving the top individual tax rate above 35 percent?
A  I can't make that decision until I see what they come down with. What tax reform must be is, first of all, revenue neutral. It must not be a concealed tax increase—which most people in this country have cynically and with justification come to expect. Tax-reform legislation must be fair, and it must be simple.

Q  Mr. President, you backed the Gramm-Rudman idea of cutting the deficit, but some of your advisers are getting cold feet because they think it will lead to cuts in defense or a tax increase. Where do you stand on that now?
A  The same thing is happening there as is happening with tax reform. The original proposal was a six-year plan of continued decreases aimed at getting a balanced budget. Now proposals are being introduced that I think would subvert the good, sound policy intent of the original Gramm-Rudman-Hollings bill. Some in Congress want to make big cuts in defense spending that I don't believe we can afford. Certainly I wouldn't want to go to Geneva with any new defense cuts in my hip pocket.

Q  So the House version of Gramm-Rudman is unacceptable to you?
A  What they're talking about in the Democratic version is unacceptable.

Q  And you've drawn the line at the 3 percent real increase in Pentagon spending for 1987 and 1988 agreed on earlier?
A  Yes. I agreed on that, and I don't think the Congress that passed it and agreed to it should now, in a kind of a sneaky manner, attempt to throw it out.

Q  On another subject, Attorney General Meese says the Supreme Court has not been following original intentions of the Founding Fathers in ruling on such issues as prayer and criminal rights. Some members of the Court have publicly disagreed. What are your views on that?
A  Over recent years, we have had courts that tended to legislate rather than interpret the Constitution. Their ruling against prayer in schools is kind of strange in a body that opens with prayer and that has over its doorway ''In God We Trust."

I am opposed to the idea of a formal prayer in school and a dictated prayer by officialdom or school authorities or anyone else. What I am in favor of is eliminating a court decision that tells a generation of young people coming up through our schools that prayer is unacceptable in certain public areas. The Congress of the United States opens with prayer. I think the Supreme Court went beyond its province there.

I also believed in affirmative action and civil rights before there were any things called affirmative action and civil rights. I was raised in a household in which the way you could really get in trouble with your mother and father was if you showed any evidences of prejudice against anyone. When I was a sports announcer, I was one of a small coterie that was trying to open baseball up to other races.

And at the same time, I saw the misuse of quotas in the schools, hospitals and so forth. Today, affirmative action is being distorted to mean the reimplementation of quotas. That isn't what the civil-rights bill was all about. Anyone who wants to argue about that can just look at Hubert Humphrey's own words. He said the bill was not put into effect to militate against anyone. I would be willing to support changes to insure that there would not be quotas.

Q  Mr. President, you've been called a very lucky man. You've survived an assassination attempt and have come through a serious operation. But right now you're on the verge of what could be a turning point in your tenure. Will your luck hold in Geneva?
A  Sometimes I think you make your own luck. But then maybe what some people are calling luck are just answers to prayers.