U.S. Marines in Iraq's Sunni Heartland Prepare to Pull Back From Once-Violent Cities

A U.S. marine watches children play in the Iraqi city of Ramadi.

For these men, "carrying a weapon in some capacity is very much a mark of honor," says Wayne White, formerly the State Department's top intelligence expert on Iraq and now with the Middle East Institute. If offered government jobs, many would be unlikely to accept, he adds. "And who knows what those turned away would do with themselves in that scenario?" Indeed, some former SOI members have been arrested by police or coalition forces in recent weeks on fears they would return to their insurgent pasts.

The existing Iraqi police units have managed to keep a lid on the violence in Ramadi. But keeping the peace in these neighborhoods often means relying on men who earned their chops serving Saddam Hussein. One commander, known only as Colonel Hassan, heads the Ramadi police force after spending more than 25 years in military intelligence under the former regime. Dressed in a crisp blue uniform, he keeps a machine gun and a white-handled machete behind his desk. During a recent meeting, Capt. Dallas Shaw, commander of the 2/9 Weapons Company, inquired about an insurgent rumored to have been released. "Don't listen to rumors," Hassan said with a chuckle. "I decide what goes on in my area and who gets released." Hassan has proved to be one of the more dependable and trustworthy chiefs in town. One of his fellow police commanders wears a hatchet on his belt. He became a local legend when he used it in the middle of the street to kill several captured AQI members.

Despite Hassan's bravado, there are some 3,000 prisoners returning to Ramadi as part of a national prisoner release. "It's a concern and one of the first challenges for the Iraqi security forces that we've worked to bolster," says Shaw. "If they are able to monitor these men and keep them out of trouble, it will be a major success."

Reconstruction of cities and infrastructure—sorely needed in Anbar—is also being transitioned to the Iraqis. The marines in Anbar now tell Iraqi leaders to ask Baghdad, instead of them, for funding for things like trash collection and fuel. "It's not a lack of money. It's that we are slowly going away, and you'll need to do this for yourselves," Shaw tells a group of city counselors.

Since 2005, the United States has pumped some $1.2 billion into the province, according to military estimates. But the Shiite-dominated central government has never been keen on sending money to the Sunnis in Anbar. "Baghdad likes to throw monkey wrenches into things for this province," says Lt. Col. Grady Belyeu, who works on reconstruction budgeting for Marine units.

"It's too soon." Tribal leaders in Anbar want the marines to leave, but not quite yet. These leaders have enjoyed lucrative reconstruction projects and fear a resurgence of Iranian influence. "We want the Americans to stay here and continue funding projects in the city," says Kaleef Mohammad Rahim, deputy chief of the North Ramadi Council. "We know Americans want us to be independent and stand on our own two feet, but it's too soon."

A major step toward independence is coming with the elections scheduled at the end of the year. The first provincial vote was boycotted by most Sunnis, a move that has dramatically hampered the functioning of local government. The coming election's aftermath, however, is uncertain. Sunnis in Anbar will likely side with their tribes, many agree, placing them in power and perhaps fueling internecine strife. The tribes are far from united, and it has recently become clear that many leaders who were first to fight against AQI and side with the Americans are not as adept at campaigning. Many of those who were late to shift have done better at winning over potential voters, a split that is at the heart of the sporadic unrest.